Philip Sabin's "The Face of Roman Battle"

Historians typically agree that superior Roman battlefield strategy and tactics allowed them expand their empire through conquest around the Mediterranean world.  Significant debate, however, surrounds the specific details of that strategy. In his article, The Face of Roman Battle Philip Sabin applies the principles put forth in John Keegan’s The Face of Battle, which begins with Agincourt, to infantry warfare in the Roman period. Sabin contextualizes his discussion by comparing it to the Greek tactics that preceded Roman developments.

               

                Sabin begins with four contextual facts about Roman warfare gleaned from primary source accounts of battles as well from archeological evidence.

1.       The duration of the clashes: Unlike the relatively short battles of the earlier Greek hoplite period, Roman battles were typically long, drawn out engagements that lasted several hours before one side broke formation and ran.   

2.       The casualties inflicted on both sides: While in Greek warfare both sides incurred light casualties and the battle ended when one side broke and ran, Roman warfare was markedly different. The Romans would often encircle their opponents, or send cavalry chasing after routed opponents, making escape impossible. Therefore, casualties on the winning side were fairly light, while at the same time, it was not unusual for over half of the defeated force to be killed or taken captive.

3.       The mobility of the two fighting lines: Unlike Greek warfare, which was largely static, Roman warfare was marked by advances and retreats of several hundred yards from original front line of the engagement. This strategy was necessary to make Roman envelopment tactics workable.

4.       Role of supporting ranks: In Greek warfare, supporting ranks added depth to the fighting formation. Roman warfare, however, was characterized by multiple supporting lines of infantry that could relieve the front line before exhaustion set in.

Having established these facts, Sabin uses them to disprove four commonly held theories of Roman battle strategy.

1.       The shoving match: This theory maintains units in tightly packed formations would lock shields with the opposing army, pressing against one another while only occasionally attacking, the goal being to punch through the enemy line. This theory fails to account for the mobility of Roman battle tactics.  

2.       The hand-to-hand duels: Sabin refers to this as the Hollywood image of two forces breaking rank and rushing towards one another, with combat consisting of hundreds of individual duels. This theory cannot be accurate because, if it were, casualty rates would be much higher on both sides than the historical record reveals.

3.       Continuous front line dueling: In this theory, the front line of each army would continually fight each other until one gave way. This theory clashes with the protracted nature of Roman battles.  Human stamina would not last long under these conditions.

4.       Javelin volleys: According to this theory, opposing sides would maintain distance, trading volleys of javelins until a charge was ordered to finish off an already disorganized opposing force. This theory also does not make use of the Roman’s supporting ranks.   

Sabin argues that, in light of the contextual facts of Roman warfare, the most likely explanation of roman strategy is that armies would clash, fight until they became tired, disengage, rotate fresh troops from supporting ranks to the front, and engage again. Forcing one side to retreat with every disengagement granted the mobility necessary to enact Roman envelopment tactics. Short bouts of combat, with respites between, explain both the length of Roman battles, and the relatively low casualties of the victorious side.

While Sabin’s theory remains conjecture, his systematic approach to Roman strategy creates a compelling argument that seems likely to be true.  

Further Reading:

Llyod, James. "Roman Army." Ancient History Encyclopedia, 2013. http://www.ancient.eu.com/Roman_Army/

Sabin, Philip. "The Face of Roman Battle." Jstor Vol. 90. (2000): 1-17.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/300198

Simkin, John. "Military Tactics of the Roman Army." Spartacus Educational. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ROMmilitary.htm

"Soldiers." PBS.com. http://www.pbs.org/empires/romans/empire/soldiers.html

Julius Caesar's Assassination

The Assassination of Julius Caesar

Julius Caesar's assassination was a pivotal moment in the history of Rome. Its aftermath split Rome among competing factions and led to Octavian's ascendance to power as Caesar Augustus, Rome's first true emperor. This historical event is shrouded in myths and legends that have captured popular imagination for over two millennia, but the facts are every bit as interesting.

Caesar was assassinated on March 15^th, 44 BC. This date is more commonly referred to as the Ides of March, and was a day of religious ceremony and observance in Ancient Rome. In Shakespeare’s famous play Julius Caesar, Caesar is warned by a soothsayer to, “Beware the Ides of March,” shortly before his death. The line serves to heighten the dramatic tension of Shakespeare’s play, but there is no actual historical record of this event occurring.

Marcus Brutus is remembered in history as the man who betrayed and killed Caesar, prompting Caesar, in Shakespeare’s version of events, to exclaim, “Et tu Brute?” which, translated means “And you too, Brutus?” As the Shakespeare quote implies, however, Brutus did not act alone. Some accounts claim as many as sixty men conspired together to assassinate Caesar, including 16 senators, Brutus being one of them. Given how vilified they have been across the centuries, their motives, by most accounts, were surprisingly pure. They did not seek to assassinate Caesar in a grab for political power. Instead, they feared Caesar posed an existential threat to the Roman Republic and sought to preserve the Republic through his death. Nor were their fears unfounded. Caesar had marched his army across the Rubicon River, an illegal act, which caused a civil war. When he had subdued his rival, Pompey, he returned to Rome and appointed himself dictator for life. For many of the conspirators, this was the last straw. They all agreed that Caesar must be stopped.

The conspirators met in small groups in the homes of the more prominent members of the group. Several assassination plans were considered before they settled on killing him in the Senate. This plan had several advantages. First, only senators were allowed into the senate chamber so Caesar’s bodyguards would not be present. Second, the senatorial toga that was required apparel while the senate was in session would provide ample room to hide daggers. Most importantly, it carried an important symbolic message: the senate, as the seat of power in the Roman Republic, would not suffer the presence of tyrants or dictators among them.

Julius Caesar, who was to leave Rome on March 18^th on a military campaign, arrived at the Senate Building on the 15^th unaware of what awaited him. As he stood in front of the Theater of Pompey, the conspirators moved in around him. Servilius Casca struck the first blow, which glanced off of Caesar’s collarbone, before the others, including Brutus, drew their daggers and stabbed him to death.

Following the assassination, Brutus and the other conspirators expected to be treated as saviors of the Republic, but instead they were forced to flee Rome, pursued by Octavian, Julius Caesar’s adopted son. After the conspirators were either captured, or killed, a memorial, which was only recently unearthed by archaeologists, was erected in the exact spot where Caesar was assassinated. His death, intended to save the Republic, instead signaled the last days of the Republic. In Julius Caesar the Roman Empire found its first martyr. Rulers around the world would appropriate his name as a title of authority for centuries: Kejsare, Czar, Kaiser etc. Though Caesar died an untimely death, his name has lived on. 

Recommended Reading

"The Ides of March: Julius Caesar is Murdered." History.com. http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-ides-of-march-julius-caesar-is-murdered (accessed March 20, 2014).

"The Assassination of Julius Caesar, 44BC." Eye Witness to History.com. http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/caesar2.htm (accessed March 20, 2014).

Dryden, John. "Plutarch: The Assassination of Julius Caesar, from Marcus Brutus." Fordham University.edu. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/plutarch-caesar.asp (accessed March 20, 2014).

Pappas, Stephanie. "Spot Where Julius Caesar was Stabbed Discovered." Live Science.com. http://www.livescience.com/23900-julius-caesar-assassination-place-discovered.html (accessed March 20, 2014).