Philip Sabin's "The Face of Roman Battle"

Historians typically agree that superior Roman battlefield strategy and tactics allowed them expand their empire through conquest around the Mediterranean world.  Significant debate, however, surrounds the specific details of that strategy. In his article, The Face of Roman Battle Philip Sabin applies the principles put forth in John Keegan’s The Face of Battle, which begins with Agincourt, to infantry warfare in the Roman period. Sabin contextualizes his discussion by comparing it to the Greek tactics that preceded Roman developments.

               

                Sabin begins with four contextual facts about Roman warfare gleaned from primary source accounts of battles as well from archeological evidence.

1.       The duration of the clashes: Unlike the relatively short battles of the earlier Greek hoplite period, Roman battles were typically long, drawn out engagements that lasted several hours before one side broke formation and ran.   

2.       The casualties inflicted on both sides: While in Greek warfare both sides incurred light casualties and the battle ended when one side broke and ran, Roman warfare was markedly different. The Romans would often encircle their opponents, or send cavalry chasing after routed opponents, making escape impossible. Therefore, casualties on the winning side were fairly light, while at the same time, it was not unusual for over half of the defeated force to be killed or taken captive.

3.       The mobility of the two fighting lines: Unlike Greek warfare, which was largely static, Roman warfare was marked by advances and retreats of several hundred yards from original front line of the engagement. This strategy was necessary to make Roman envelopment tactics workable.

4.       Role of supporting ranks: In Greek warfare, supporting ranks added depth to the fighting formation. Roman warfare, however, was characterized by multiple supporting lines of infantry that could relieve the front line before exhaustion set in.

Having established these facts, Sabin uses them to disprove four commonly held theories of Roman battle strategy.

1.       The shoving match: This theory maintains units in tightly packed formations would lock shields with the opposing army, pressing against one another while only occasionally attacking, the goal being to punch through the enemy line. This theory fails to account for the mobility of Roman battle tactics.  

2.       The hand-to-hand duels: Sabin refers to this as the Hollywood image of two forces breaking rank and rushing towards one another, with combat consisting of hundreds of individual duels. This theory cannot be accurate because, if it were, casualty rates would be much higher on both sides than the historical record reveals.

3.       Continuous front line dueling: In this theory, the front line of each army would continually fight each other until one gave way. This theory clashes with the protracted nature of Roman battles.  Human stamina would not last long under these conditions.

4.       Javelin volleys: According to this theory, opposing sides would maintain distance, trading volleys of javelins until a charge was ordered to finish off an already disorganized opposing force. This theory also does not make use of the Roman’s supporting ranks.   

Sabin argues that, in light of the contextual facts of Roman warfare, the most likely explanation of roman strategy is that armies would clash, fight until they became tired, disengage, rotate fresh troops from supporting ranks to the front, and engage again. Forcing one side to retreat with every disengagement granted the mobility necessary to enact Roman envelopment tactics. Short bouts of combat, with respites between, explain both the length of Roman battles, and the relatively low casualties of the victorious side.

While Sabin’s theory remains conjecture, his systematic approach to Roman strategy creates a compelling argument that seems likely to be true.  

Further Reading:

Llyod, James. "Roman Army." Ancient History Encyclopedia, 2013. http://www.ancient.eu.com/Roman_Army/

Sabin, Philip. "The Face of Roman Battle." Jstor Vol. 90. (2000): 1-17.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/300198

Simkin, John. "Military Tactics of the Roman Army." Spartacus Educational. http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/ROMmilitary.htm

"Soldiers." PBS.com. http://www.pbs.org/empires/romans/empire/soldiers.html